The Impact of Private Equity on Employment: The Consequences of Fund Country of Origin—New Evidence from France by Guery, L et al.
The Impact of Private Equity on Employment: The Effect of PE’s Home Country 
 
 
 
Guery, L. 
University of Lorraine, ISAM-IAE, 25 rue Baron Louis, 54000 Nancy, France 
e-mail: loris.guery@univ-lorraine.fr 
 
Stévenot, A.  
University of Lorraine, ISAM-IAE, 25 rue Baron Louis, 54000 Nancy, France 
e-mail: anne.stevenot@univ-lorraine.fr 
 
 
Wood, G.T.* 
Warwick Business School, Scarman Road, University of Warwick, Coventry, West Midlands CV4 7AL, 
UK 
e-mail: geoffrey.wood@wbs.ac.uk 
 
and  
 
Brewster, C.  
ISCTE Business School, Avenida das Forças Armadas, 1649-026 Lisboa, Portugal  
& 
Henley Business School, University of Reading, Whiteknights, Reading, RG6 6UD, UK 
e-mail: c.j.brewster@henley.ac.uk 
 
 
 
  
 The Impact of Private Equity on Employment:  The Consequences of Fund Country of Origin – New 
Evidence from France 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This is a study of country of origin effects of Private Equity (PE) investment on employment in France 
applies propensity score matching methodology to establishment level survey data. We find a 
significant difference between the effects of investment by foreign and domestic French PE, that 
have become more pronounced since the onset of the financial crisis that began in 2008.  The 
former were more likely to induce job shedding and employment flexibility. In contrast, there was 
not a significant difference in these areas between firms that French PE invested in, and those with 
no PE investment at all.  
 
  
Introduction 
This is a study of country of origin effects of private equity on work and employment in France. 
There has been growing controversy as to the role and consequences of private equityi (PE) for 
stakeholders within and beyond the firm (Clarke 2007, 2013; Wood and Wright 2010). Particular 
attention has been focused on the impact on employees, with arguments being advanced both 
within the academic and practitioner literature that private equity takeovers may leave employees 
considerably worse off.   If a limitation of the early literature on the subject was a limited evidence 
base (Wood and Wright 2010), a limitation of more recent work has been a tendency to concentrate 
on liberal market economies.   The latter are generally held as contexts particularly conducive to the 
emergence and sustenance of new investors, and encouraging more short-term investor behaviour. 
There has been even less work on the differences in practice disseminated by PE players of different 
national origin, with the notable exception of a 2012 study by Bacon et al. (2012).  In attempting to 
redress this lacuna, this study looks implications of private equity takeovers by players of different 
national origins on employees in France, a country where institutional mediation remains 
significantly stronger than that encountered in liberal market economies such as the United 
Kingdom.  
 
 Whilst there is controversy over the role of private equity, both critics and proponents of the 
industry agree that a major consequence of such takeovers is a realignment of corporate agendas to 
focus on enhancing owner returns, particularly in the short term (see Jensen 2006; Rosenbuch et al. 
2013).  Investors’ associations argue that this focus has a positive effect on employment (see, for 
example, A.T. Kearney 2007; British Venture Capital Association 2006; European Venture Capital 
Association 2005; Shapiro and Pham 2008; and the Association française des investisseurs pour la 
croissance [AFIC] 2013 for the French case). In contrast, employee associations and unions argue 
that it has negative effects on wages and employment. For example, the Service Employees 
International Union has argued that: “Typically it’s easier to decrease costs quickly by cutting heads, 
which is why buyouts have typically been accompanied by layoffs” (Rasmussen 2008). 
Most studies that have investigated the link between PE and employment have focused on the USA 
(Davis et al. 2008; Davis et al. 2011; Kaplan 1989; Lichtenberger and Siegel 1990; Opler 1992) and 
the UK (Amess and Wright 2007a, 2007b; Amess et al. 2008; Georgen et al. 2011; Wright and Coyne 
1985; Wilson et al. 2012), although there is also an emerging body of work looking at continental 
Europe (Boselie and Koene 2010; Wieser et al. 2007).  The results of these studies are by no means 
consistent.  Simply examining the organizational level employment data may be misleading. For 
example, an increase in employee numbers in one organization may be due to a merger, whilst at 
the same time jobs are being shed in the acquired organization, leading to a net loss of jobs (Davis et 
al. 2011).  Again, employment changes following a takeover may lead to a rebalancing of the ratios 
between operators and managerial staff, leaving one or other category worse off.  Hence, it could be 
argued that there is a need for further research that more closely examines establishment level 
changes (Wright et al. 2009). Moreover, existing studies almost never take into account differences 
in strategies and objectives between PE firms. Bacon et al. (2013) underline that most of the 
criticisms of PE relate to short-term investors focused on increasing organizational efficiency to 
extract value, but that other kinds of PE investors exist. Furthermore, there are few international 
studies that compare practices of PE in Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) and in Coordinated Market 
Economies, and other types of capitalism (Amable 2003; Hall and Soskice 2001; Whitley 1999).   And, 
with the notable exception of Bacon et al. (2012), there has been even less work on PE country of 
origin effects.    The Bacon et al. (2012) study, however, primarily focused on the dissemination of 
high performance work practices. It found no country of origin effects in this regard, and also noted 
a general tendency towards a greater usage of high performance work practices following a private 
equity takeover. However, the study was only of firms subject to private equity buy-outs, and thus 
did not seek to do any comparisons with firms that were not.  
  
This paper seeks to contribute to filling these gaps in the literature. We carry out an empirical study 
on the effects of PE funding on employment in French establishments, based on the REPONSE 
survey, which is a nationally representative survey of French establishments. The French PE market 
is currently the second largest in Europe after the UK, with about €41.51 billion funds invested 
between 2007 and 2012 in 3054 companies (vs. €64.45 billion and 2940 companies for the UK) 
(EVCA – Frontier Economics 2013). Activity in the French PE market is therefore economically 
sizeable, both with respect to the French economy and to the rest of the world, making France an 
interesting setting to investigate the impact of PE investment (Gaspar 2012). 
We address three issues. First, using propensity score matching procedures, we assess the effect of 
private equity on the overall workforce employment of our sample of 1629 French establishments 
(for 2011). We replicate this analysis for 2005 with a sample of 1461 establishments in order to 
confirm the results. Second, we focus on the impact of PE on employment for different job 
categories in 2011 and 2005, to check whether there are differences between production employees 
and non-production employees (Lichtenberger and Siegel 1990). Third, we investigate the ‘country 
of origin effect’ of PE. There are indeed both French PE firms and foreign PE firms (mainly American 
and British) operating in France, a country associated with greater institutional mediation (and 
stronger employment protection) than is found in LMEs (Whitley 1999). 
The paper is structured as follow. The first section uses the literature to explore the issues and leads 
to the development of our research hypotheses. The following section describes the data and 
methods. We then report the results and discuss them and finally we draw conclusions for 
practitioners and for research. 
 
Theoretical background and hypotheses 
Impact of private equity on employment. Jensen (2006) and Wright et al. (2006) argue that PE 
reduces the ownership and control divide by putting in place active investors who provide more 
direct scrutiny of managerial behavior. Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue that a change in 
ownership permits new management to renegotiate the implicit contracts of employment of existing 
workers. Wage payments may be revisited, particularly those exceeding the marginal product of 
labor. There can also be a reduction in employment or at least of implicit assumptions of job 
security. However, an alternative argument is that PE may increase employment as companies 
funded by PE pursue growth strategies (Wright et al. 2000, 2001). PE funding provides managers 
with the discretion to decide what business plans to pursue in order to maximize profits (Wright et 
al. 2001). Given that PEs typically increases managements’ equity stake, such decisions will be 
motivated by managers seeking to maximize their own wealth and income.  
As we have seen, the evidence on the effects of private equity on employment is mixed (see Bacon 
et al. 2013; Wright et al. 2009, for overviews). “Reviews of 18 different studies by Wright, Gilligan, 
and Amess (2009) and Wright, Bacon, and Amess (2009) and Lutz and Achleitner’s (2009) review of 
49 studies all highlighted the mixed findings of individual studies, but concluded that overall PE LBOs 
do not appear to systematically erode employment” (Bacon et al. 2013: p.9). Similarly, Tag’s (2012) 
recent review of employment effects in 17 studies finds “weakly negative or no effects on 
employment” (p.278). 
A possible explanation for these mixed results is that the disposal of noncore parts of the business 
following PE acquisition causes an immediate but short-lived employment decline at the firm level 
(Amess et al 2008; Amess and Wright 2010; Davis et al. 2011; Wright et al. 2009) which can then be 
compensated or exceeded by the growth of the firm; however, recent work challenges this finding 
(Clarke 2013). PE can contribute to employment decline in case of divestments involving the sale of 
establishments that does not equate with job destruction, and to employment growth via the 
acquisition of establishments that does not reflect job creation (Appelbaum and Batt 2012). The 
problem is that it is not fully clear to what extent reductions in employment are the result of 
divestments of divisions or increases the result of acquisitions (Wright et al. 2009). There is 
therefore a need to examine establishment level changes (Wright et al. 2009). 
Based on recent findings within the HRM literature (Clarke 2013; Goergen et al 2011), we posit the 
following hypothesis:  
(H1) PE has a negative impact on employment at establishment level. 
Further, most existing studies focus on the impact of PE on employment of the overall workforce. 
However, as Wright et al. (2009) argue, PE takeovers may affect non-managerial employees 
differently to managerial ones. Although there is a limited range of work in this area, Lichtenberger 
and Siegel (1990) found a reduction in the ratio of non-production to production workers, with the 
latter being unaffected by the PE takeover. Therefore, we posit the following hypothesis:  
(H2) The negative impact of PE on employment is stronger for non-production workers than 
for production workers. 
 
Private equity and Varieties of Capitalism. The literature on comparative capitalisms makes a 
common distinction between liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated markets economies 
(CMEs) (Dore 2000; Hall and Soskice 2001). In the former, shareholders or owners of the business 
enjoy extensive rights. In the latter, a wider group of stakeholders, including employees, enjoy 
greater rights, in terms of both formal and informal regulation and associated social ties; hence, 
employment is more secure, and employee countervailing power more effective than in LMEs (see 
Dore 2000; Goergen et al. 2009; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990; Whitley, 1999).  In other words, within 
CMEs, there is a tradition of long-term labor contracts and greater security against lay-offs (Hall and 
Soskice 2001). France has a somewhat ambiguous position in relation to the LME/CME distinction 
(Goergen et al. 2012). However, levels of employment protection are clearly closer to the CME than 
the LME archetype (Hall and Soskice 2001; Harcourt and Wood 2007).  
The literature on comparative HRM points to profound differences in firm practices not only 
according to country of operation, but also country of ownership; it has been argued that firms 
originating in LMEs are particularly likely to disseminate practices associated with their country of 
origin into other settings (for example Almond 2011; Farndale et al. 2008; Ferner 1997; Gooderham 
et al. 1999). 
French origin private equity players are different to their UK counterparts, given considerable 
variations in the importance of government agencies and of syndication. At the European level of 
analysis, the contribution of government agencies in 2013 was 38% of the total fundraising 
(European Private Equity Activity Data 2007-2013, EVCA). Both the UK and France are below this 
European average but with an important difference between them: fundraising by government 
agencies is almost non-existent in the UK private equity industry (1.6% of total fundraising between 
2007 and 2013) while it is a significant element of total fundraising in France (13.5%). Syndication is 
also much more developed in the French private equity market, as more than half of the 
investments made in France between 2007 and 2013 are syndicated investments (53.9%), compared 
with 30.3% in UK. 
These differences have two major implications. The first one is that in France domestic PE players 
depending on government agencies are unlikely to be focused purely on financial objectives. For 
example, Bpifrance, the main public investment group with the French State as shareholder, has the 
following approach: 
 “…in addition to appraising the financial performance of a business when making 
investment decisions (profitability, sustainability, liquidity), Bpifrance Investment takes into 
account [...]extra-financial factors such as export and international expansion potential, 
contribution to innovation, Environmental, Social and Governance practices, effects on 
territorial employment and development, the role within the sector, the development of 
family businesses, etc” (Bpifrance, 2013, The Doctrine, p.36).  
The second implication is relative to the ‘diffusion effect’ of syndication. The literature on PE 
syndication notes that the interests of the lead investor may not always coincide with the interests 
of non-lead investors (Meuleman et al. 2009). Given that lead investors have both more informal 
control of the companies they back through their privileged access to information and more formal 
control through their residual rights of control, they are able to impose their will on non-lead 
investors. But in syndication investors are also able to share their views, specific knowledge and 
complementary skills (Brander et al. 2002). Being lead-investor or not, public investors can therefore 
promote their values and objectives to other investors. Bpifrance favors syndication and promotes 
corporate social responsibility to partner investors and the companies they back (Bpifrance 2013).   
In addition to some 250 French PE players represented by AFIC, LME origin PE is directly involved in 
funding French companies. For example Blackstone has invested more than €1.6 billions in France, 
including in the Trianon Palace in Versailles and in Vitalia group (second private hospital group). Bain 
Capital acquired Maisons du Monde (home furnishings and home decor) in June, 2013, for €680 
million. In the textile and clothing sectors, private equity firms such as TA Associates, Change Capital 
Partners, TowerBrook Capital Partners and KKR have invested in the French brands Zadig et Voltaire, 
Paule K, Kaporal and Sandro between 2011 and 2013. While it is easy to identify the French PE firms 
thanks to AFIC, it is difficult to get reliable information about foreign PE firms that invest in French 
non-listed companies. PE industry news and discussions with members of AFIC suggest that foreign 
PE firms are mainly of direct LME origin, or with ownership being lodged in fiscally attractive 
European countries such as Luxembourg or Malta.  
Given the ability of PE firms to influence employment and given the differences between LMEs and 
CMEs, particularly with this state participation in the PE industry in France, we predict that the 
largely LME origin of foreign private equity investors will mean that: 
(H3) Foreign PE investment is more likely to have negative employment consequences on 
French establishments than French PE investment is. 
 
Data and methods 
Data and variables. We use data from the French REPONSE survey (Relations Professionnelles et 
Négociations d’Entreprise), conducted in 2005 and 2011 by the research center of the French 
Ministry of Labor (DARES). As a nationally representative establishment-level survey, REPONSE is 
very similar to the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS). It therefore mainly 
concerns industrial relations but, to our knowledge, it is one of the very few databases that includes 
information on the ownership status of companies that are both listed and not listed. A 
representative sample of 2 930 establishments with at least 20 employees was surveyed in 2005. In 
2011, 4 000 establishments were surveyed, but with at least 11 employees.  As it is compulsory to 
complete the survey sent out by the Ministry of Labour, the response rate was almost 100%.  To be 
able to compare the results of 2011 with those of 2005, we keep only the establishments of at least 
20 employees. We exclude from the sample public administration, financial sector, company 
establishments whose employees are the main shareholders (as in workers’ co-operatives) and listed 
companies, in order to keep establishments that could be funded by private equity to develop their 
activity (Wood and Wright, 2010). The final sample size is 1 461 for 2005 and 1 629 for 2011. We 
have ensured that this sample deals with firms financed by private equity but not firms financed by 
venture-capital. Indeed, all the investor owned firms in the sample are more than five years old and 
have more than 50 employees: they are not start-ups. 
One top manager per establishment was asked questions about company ownership, establishment 
characteristics, employment, human resource management and industrial relations. The question 
relative to ownership is “What is the main category of shareholder of the company?” This allows us 
to know whether ownership is private equity or other shareholders: and family, non-financial 
company or others. Whatever the country it is difficult to get reliable data on ultimate ownership for 
non-listed companies. We define a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is owned 
by a private equity firm, and 0 otherwise. In 2005, 9.6% of the establishments in our sample belong 
to PE funded companies. According to a 2012 study by Grant Thorton and AFIC, the number of 
companies funded by private equity in France increased between the mid 2000’s and 2011. Our 
sample reflects this evolution with 10.9% of the establishments belonging to PE funded companies in 
2011. The questionnaire asked the top manager to distinguish one of two cases regarding the 
nationality of the shareholder: the private equity firm is French or the private equity firm is foreign. 
One question in the REPONSE survey is about the variation of the workforce in the establishment 
during the past three years. This question is not very precise (it does not capture the range of 
variation) but it offers simple data at the establishment level. For Wright et al. (2009) and Davis et al. 
(2011) it is very important to focus analysis at establishment level because, for example, reductions 
of employment at firm level can be the result of divestments of divisions and increases can be the 
result of acquisitions. Establishment level is therefore the most relevant level of analysis, allowing us 
to capture greenfield job creation or job destruction. The same question is then asked for each job 
category present in the establishment: managers, first-line managers and technicians, office and 
clerical worker, skilled and unskilled workers. We create a dummy variable for the decrease of the 
workforce at establishment level, and other dummies for each of the four job categories. As 
temporary employees may partially or completely compensate lay-offs in order to give more 
flexibility, we create a dummy for the presence of temporary workers. 
As underlined by Davis et. al (2011), employment variation may be affected by some characteristics 
of the parent firm (size, multi-unit or not) and of the establishment (age, industry). All these factors 
are controlled by dummy variables.  A job variation may also be influenced by whether there is trade 
union representative able to negotiate lay-offs, so we control for trade union presence in the 
establishment. Tetrachoric correlations were computed for all the variables used in our analysis for 
2005 and 2011. No significant problems have emerged.  
Propensity score matching method. One of the main limits of cross-sectional studies of private 
equity and employment is that they fail to identify causal links between the former and the latter.  In 
this paper, we apply propensity score matching to estimate the ‘causal treatment effect’ of private 
equity on employment at establishment levelii. This allows direct comparison between PE funded 
companies and non-funded companies using a representative survey, an area where there is “a 
crucial need for systematic academic evidence” (Wright et al. 2009b, p.365). 
Propensity score matching has become a popular approach to estimate causal treatment effects in 
non-experimental causal studies (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). It is used for example when 
evaluating labor market policies (Heckman et al., 1997) or the effect of unionization on wages (Eren 
2007). To our knowledge, only one study employs propensity score matching to estimate the 
consequences of leverage buyouts, private equity and acquisitions on wages and employment 
(Amess et al. 2008). 
Rubin (1974) defines a causal effect as the: “measure for a specific person [of] the difference 
between the likely outcome of a person’s participation in a measure and the likely outcome of a 
person’s non-participation” (Rubin 1974, p.689). In our case, being funded by private equity is the 
binary treatment. 
It can be argued that companies funded by private equity might differ from companies that are not 
funded by private equity (e.g. they need more money to finance their growth; they are more 
attractive for private equity firms, etc.). In this case our results would suffer from a selection bias 
because the assignment of observations to our treatment group would not be a random process. 
Therefore we used propensity score matching analysis to adjust this selection bias (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin 1983). Using this method we can compare employment differences between establishments 
that are as similar as possible with respect to age, industry, size of the parent firm, presence of a 
trade union representative, except for the fact than one establishment (treatment group) is part of a 
company funded by private equity and the other (control group) is not. 
The first step is to estimate the propensity score that is defined as the probability for an 
establishment of being part of company funded by private equity. We estimate this probability using 
a Probit regression model which is usually preferred at this stage (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). The 
model includes as dependent variable our dummy for private equity ownership, and as explanatory 
variables, the characteristics of the establishment and of the parent firm noted above. Only variables 
that influence simultaneously the participation decision (i.e. being funded by private equity) and the 
outcome variable (i.e. employment) should be included (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). After deriving 
the propensity score, we need to ensure that there is enough common support. This is done by 
discarding treated establishments with a propensity score laying outside the range of propensity 
scores for establishments in the control group. Therefore, treated establishments lacking a pair wise 
control group observation are eliminated. 
The second step is to match the establishments in the treated group (funded by private equity) to 
similar establishments in the control group (not funded). Various matching methods have been 
proposed in the literature as a means to identify a comparison group, such as nearest-neighbor (NN) 
or kernel matching (KM)iii. As there is no clear evidence of how to choose the ‘good’ matching 
method, it seemed sensible to try a number of approaches, given that with growing sample size they 
all become closer to comparing exact matches (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). Therefore, we use a 
number of them as a robustness check. The most intuitive matching method is nearest-neighbor 
matching, which matches each treated observation to a control observation with the closest 
propensity score. We implement this procedure with replacement; that is, each treated 
establishment has one match, but a control group establishment may be matched to more than one 
treated establishment. One problem with NN matching is that it faces the risk of bad matches if the 
closest neighbor is far away. The kernel matching method offers an alternative. In KM, the 
contribution of each control group observation is weighted so as to attach greater weight to ‘good’ 
matches. Two kernel functions are used: Gaussian kernel and Epanechnikov kernel. One major 
advantage of KM is the lower variance which is achieved because more information is used for 
constructing counterfactual outcomes. 
In the third step, we compare the matched establishments with respect to the variation of 
employment. Thus, we are able to analyze the hypothesized effect of private equity on employment, 
ruling out any potential selection bias. Once each treated observation is matched to a control group 
observation, the difference between the outcomes for the treated versus the control observations is 
computed. The ATT (average treatment effect on the treated) is then obtained by averaging these 
differences. But testing the statistical significance of treatment effects and computing their standard 
errors is not straightforward. The problem is that the estimated variance of the treatment effect 
should also include the variance due to the estimation of the propensity score and the imputation of 
the common support. One way to deal with this problem is to use bootstrapping (Lechner 2002). 
This is a popular way to estimate standard errors in case analytical estimates are biased or 
unavailable. So our standard errors for kernel matching models are based on 1 000 bootstrap 
replications.  A limitation with bootstrap methods is their invalidity for NN matching (Abadie and 
Imbens 2008). We use therefore the nnmatch program on Stata proposed by Abadie and al. (2004) 
to obtain standard errors of treatment effects for NN matching models. 
This procedure is primarily used to estimate the effect of private equity on the total workforce of the 
establishments in 2011, then the effect on the different job categories (managers, first-line 
managers and technicians, office and clerical worker, skilled and unskilled workers) and on the 
presence of temporary employees. The procedure is afterwards replicated with the propensity score 
as the probability for an establishment of being part of company funded by a French private equity 
firm, and with the propensity score as the probability for an establishment of being part of company 
funded by a foreign private equity firm. Finally all these estimates are replicated for 2005. 
 
Results and discussion 
Univariate analysis. Table 1 describes difference in means tests for PE funded versus non funded 
establishments in 2011, then for those funded by French PE versus those funded by foreign PE 
establishments in 2011. In other words, Table 1 enables us firstly to compare the reduction in 
employment in the establishments funded by PE compared to non-funded, then to see if there are 
differences between French-funded and foreign-funded establishments. 
 ----- Table 1 about here ----- 
 
There is a clear and strongly significant difference in employment reduction of the overall workforce 
between establishments that belong to companies funded by PE and those that belong to non-
funded companies: 37% of the former show a decrease in employment against 27% of the later. The 
proportion of unfunded establishments reducing the overall workforce is variable depending on job 
categories. Whilst only 13% of the establishments have reduced the number of first-line managers, 
more than 30% reduced the number of skilled and unskilled workers. For all job categories, funded 
establishments have reduced employment more frequently than non-funded (by 6% to 10% 
depending on the category). The differences are significant for all job categories. Table 2 highlights 
that these differences were already observable in 2005, and were often greater. 
When analysis is focused on the geographical origin of the PE firm, results underline a significant 
difference in the proportion of establishments that reduced the overall workforce: 29% of the 
establishments funded by French PE reduced employment versus 46% of those funded by foreign PE. 
The situation of establishments funded by French PE is quite similar to unfunded establishments 
(29% vs. 27%). Here again the results for 2005 are very similar. 
----- Table 2 here ----- 
 
Likelihood of being funded by private equity. Table 3 displays the results from the probit models of 
the likelihood for an establishment of being part of a company funded by private equity in 2011 
(model 1), of being part of a company funded by French private equity firm in 2011 (model 2), or of 
being part of a company funded by foreign private equity firm in 2011 (model 3). Table 4 displays the 
results for 2005. 
In 2011, PE (especially French PE) favored the information and communication sector. In contrast, in 
both 2005 and 2011, there was little interest in wholesale and retail. The age of the establishment 
and business strategy have little or no influence on the probability of being funded, either in 2005 or 
2011. There is almost no relationship between size and the likelihood of being funded by PE in 2005, 
whereas this link is very strong in 2011. This may reflect a reduced appetite for risk taking since the 
onset of the financial crisis. 
Impact of private equity on employment. Our first hypothesis is that PE has a negative impact on 
employment. As predicted, there is statistically significant evidence of a link between PE and a 
reduction of the overall workforce at establishment level (Table 5). The impact of PE on the overall 
workforce is stronger in 2005 than in 2011; it is likely that the financial crisis that began in 2008 
forced many organizations to downsize, leaving few opportunities for easy job-shedding following a 
PE takeover. 
Our second hypothesis, as predicted by Lichtenberger and Siegel (1990), is that the impact of PE on 
employment decrease is more important for non-production employees than for others. The results 
here are less clear-cut and quite different between 2005 and 2011. For 2005 they confirm this 
hypothesis, since there is a link between PE funding and employment reduction for managers and 
first-line managers, but no relationship with skilled and unskilled workers. More exactly, only one 
matching algorithm suggests an impact of PE funding on this category of employees and that is only 
significant at the 10% level.  
For 2011, we do not observe the same reductions. The results highlight few differences between the 
‘treated group’ (PE funded establishments) and the ‘control group’. This can be linked to a change in 
behavior of the PE funded establishments between 2005 and 2011 or to a change in behavior of the 
control group; the economic crisis may have pressured many organizations to cut staffing whether 
PE funded or not. Indeed, statistics from the Ministry of Labor and the Institut National de la 
Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE), the French National Institute for Statistics and 
Economic Studies, show an increase of the ratio “number of employees leaving the company / total 
workforce” in French companies between 2005 and 2011, with a commensurate increase in 
unemployment.  
Difference between French PE and foreign PE: the impact of PE’s home country. Our results strongly 
support the hypothesis that foreign PE funding is more likely to lead to job losses than French PE 
funding.  In 2011, being funded by a French PE firm neither effects overall workforce numbers at the 
establishment level nor employment in different job categories (see Table 6).  However, foreign PE 
investment (mostly, as noted above, LME investment) leads to job cuts, particularly for (non-line) 
managers, office and clerical workers. As with most other developed nations, France was negatively 
affected by the onset of the crisis, with a period of negative growth of -0.1% in 2008 and  -3.1% in 
2009; recovering to 1.7% in 2010, with commensurate effects on the labor market. Yet workers in 
establishments with French PE investments were no worse off than firms where there was no PE 
involvement. In the 2011 data, we do not observe any greater decline in employment in 
establishments funded by French PE than in the control group, in spite of the requirements of 
profitability commonly associated with PE funding   However, within the foreign PE firms, we 
encounter significantly greater job losses, arguably in line with a greater focus on short term returns 
that would be typical for LME companies.  
The results for 2005 differ from these in some crucial areas (see Table 7). It was a different economic 
context: the growth rate of the economy was 0.9% for 2002, 0.9% for 2003 and 2.5% for 2004.    First 
of all, being funded by a French PE firm does not have any influence on the overall workforce 
variations, although we found some differences for first-line managers and technicians. A decrease 
of first-line managers and technicians employment was significant for establishments funded by 
foreign PE firms.  The more negative consequences of foreign PE funding were also less pronounced 
prior to the crisis and, indeed, not much different to the effects of French PE funding.   This may be 
because the high levels of leverage associated with foreign PE may have been difficult to sustain in 
the aftermath of the crisis, forcing an even greater emphasis on downsizing and distribution.  
However, it also may reflect the extent to which French players may be more responsive to informal 
conventions and, as we have seen, the abiding influence of the French state. 
In both 2005 and 2011, foreign PE funding was associated with the greater usage of temporary 
workers. Again, this might reflect a more short term orientation, and a greater reliance on 
contingent labor. 
Our results highlight that, particularly since the onset of the economic crisis, it is not so much the 
fact of being funded by PE which is important, but the origin of the investors.  Our results thus differ 
from those of Bacon et al. (2012), which suggest some adaptation of Anglo-Saxon PE firms to local 
host country contexts.  
 
Conclusions   
Before drawing conclusions we note that that this study has some limitations, which open up 
opportunities for future research. While REPONSE has many of the key qualities that are desirable 
for an analysis providing a national representative sample of establishments, there are attributes 
that are less desirable. This applies to the measure of employment variation which allows only 
knowing, for each job category, whether employment declines, if it is stable or increases. It could 
also be useful to have additional data or other database to identify more precisely the identity of PE 
investors. As we have shown, most foreign investment is from LME countries but it would be 
valuable to have that detailed and to be able to separate those investors out. Our study only 
encompasses a limited time period; we recognize that the effects of PE investment over the medium 
and longer term may be rather different.   
In spite of the above limitations, we believe our analysis represents a significant contribution to the 
on-going debate about private equity and employment which we hope will inspire other scholars to 
study the ‘country effect’ of private equity. 
As Wood and Wright (2009, 2010) note, whilst there is a common tendency to make generalizations 
as to the consequences of PE takeovers, the industry is characterized by a great deal of diversity. 
What we encountered here is that investment by PE from the foreign countries (mainly Liberal 
Market Economies) was associated with more job losses, and the greater usage of temporary 
workers. Investment by French PE was generally not, and the differences in terms of job losses 
between French and LME PE became more accentuated in the aftermath of the financial crisis. This 
would reflect first of all the role of the French state within indigenous French PE.  It is likely that the 
French state exerted whatever levers were at its disposal to mitigate job losses in the aftermath of 
the crisis. Again, governments may use their financial resources to encourage what they might 
perceive as best practices in work and employment. It is also possible that the French PE sector had 
a greater notion of responsibility to its immediate social environment than an outside entrant. They 
are also likely to have a better or more nuanced understanding of the benefits and 
complementarities flowing from present practices and, hence, the risks associated with jettisoning 
them. 
Although it has been commonly argued that all developed economies are undergoing moves 
towards liberalization, this study highlights the limitations of this process. Indeed, whether by 
inaction or active policy intervention, it is evident that the French PE sector has refrained from 
acting as a pioneer of liberalization.   Rather, when it comes to pressures towards more contingent 
and insecure employment, the major driver for change appears to be exogenous. The behavior of 
foreign PE would appear to be in line with the role of LME MNCs, who appear to be more active in 
the dissemination of their country of origin model abroad than their counterparts from CMEs (c.f. 
Almond et al 2011; Gooderham et al. 1999).   
This study was motivated by three issues: that of the impact of PE on the overall workforce of firms 
in which it invests; that of the impact of PE on different job categories, and the differences in impact 
between French PE and PE from liberal markets investing in France. This study adds to the literature 
by bringing to bear detailed establishment level evidence from France, not only about overall 
employment but also about different job categories.  
Our findings have important practical and theoretical implications. From a practical perspective, the 
findings suggest that PE funding is likely to impact on managerial decision making and autonomy; 
foreign (mainly LME) PE appears more likely to promote more hardline HRM practices even if the 
company they invest in is located within a different institutional regime (c.f. Boselie and Koene 
2010).  
Theoretically, this paper contributes to the extant PE literature in several ways. To the best of our 
knowledge, it is the first paper that studies the effect of foreign PEs on employment in the country 
of domicile. The transfer of management practices from a country of origin to a host country is an 
issue for many scholars. Most research shows at least partial adaptation of owners to local 
institutional context (Almond et al. 2011; Brewster et al. 2008; Farndale et al. 2008; Ferner et al. 
2004; Gooderham et al. 1999), including the paper of Bacon et al. (2012) focused on private equity. 
Our results highlight the very different effects of French and foreign PE on employment in French 
establishments; as we have seen, the latter are significantly more likely to engage in job shedding, 
especially since the crisis. It can be argued that this may not only reflect the influence of the state, 
but also the extent to which French players would be more likely to possess information on the 
nature and benefits of the complementarities flowing from existing practices, and/or more 
responsive to informal conventions.  There is obviously a need to replicate this evidence in other 
societies in order for us to understand more fully the impact of PE on jobs.  
In France, in line with the findings of Lichtenberger and Siegel (1990), non-production employees 
were more likely to be affected by job shedding than production workers. It therefore seems 
important also to take into account the different job categories when analyzing the employment 
consequences of PE funding. 
  
Table 1. Univariate difference in means tests 2011   
 Difference in Means Tests between 
funded and non funded 
establishments 
Difference in Means Tests between 
establishments funded by French 
PE and establishments funded by 
foreign PE 
 
 
Employment reduction: 
Non 
funded 
Funded 
by PE 
t-stat : 
equal 
means 
Funded 
by French 
PE 
Funded 
by foreign 
PE 
t-stat : 
equal 
means 
Overall workforce 0.271 0.370 -2.769*** 0.287 0.464 -2.469** 
Managers 0.147 0.202 -1.897* 0.148 0.261 -1.881* 
First-line managers and 
technicians 
0.129 0.208 -2.794*** 0.181 0.237 - 0.884 
Office and clerical worker 0.211 0.311 -2.957*** 0.258 0.370 -1.576 
Skilled and unskilled 
workers 
0.309 0.401 -1.944* 0.361 0.433 -0.745 
*significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; ***significance at the 1% level 
 
Table 2. Univariate difference in means tests 2005 
 Difference in Means Tests between 
funded and non funded 
establishments 
Difference in Means Tests between 
establishments funded by French 
PE and establishments funded by 
foreign PE 
 Non 
funded 
Funded 
by PE 
t-stat : 
equal 
means 
Funded 
by French 
PE 
Funded 
by foreign 
PE 
t-stat : 
equal 
means 
Employment reduction:       
Overall workforce 0.235 0.370 -3.365*** 0.301 0.462 - 1.875* 
Managers 0.113 0.200 -2.824*** 0.222 0.169 0.719* 
First-line managers and 
technicians 
0.116 0.252 -4.214*** 0.231 0.280 - 0.592 
Office and clerical worker 206 0.277 -1.850* 0.236 0.333 -1.203 
Skilled and unskilled 
workers 
0.288 0.433 -3.090*** 0.368 0.510 -1.469 
*significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; ***significance at the 1% level 
  
Table 3. Probit models of the likelihood of being funded by private equity (2011) 
 
 Model 1 
French or 
Anglo-Saxon 
PE 
Model 2 
French PE 
Model 3 
Anglo-Saxon 
PE 
Industry    
   Construction -0.070  
(0.193) 
0.187 
(0.215) 
-0.395 
(0.304) 
   Wholesale and retail trade, accommodation 
and catering 
-0.240** 
(0.112) 
-0.003 
(0.136) 
-0.408*** 
(0.146) 
   Information and communication 0.444** 
(0.189) 
0.803*** 
(0.202) 
-0.424 
(0.335) 
   Scientific and technical activities, 
administrative and support services 
0.095 
(0.131) 
0.047 
(0.166) 
0.116 
(0.157) 
   Others Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Parent firm size    
   Less than 50 employees Ref. Ref. Ref. 
   50 - 99 employees 0.356* 
(0.186) 
0.355* 
(0.209) 
0.277 
(0.298) 
   100 - 199 employees 0.580*** 
(0.184) 
0.475** 
(0.215) 
0.649** 
(0.271) 
   200 - 499 employees 0.828*** 
(0.182) 
0.686*** 
(0.213) 
0.834*** 
(0.267) 
   500 - 999 employees 0.824*** 
(0.200) 
0.687*** 
(0.238) 
0.809*** 
(0.285) 
   1000 - 4999 employees 1.048*** 
(0.200) 
0.925*** 
(0.236) 
0.929*** 
(0.285) 
   5000 employees and more 0.940*** 
(0.217) 
0.747*** 
(0.264) 
0.910*** 
(0.300) 
Age of the establishment    
   Less than 5 years Ref. Ref. Ref. 
   5 to 9 years 0.326 
(0.289) 
0.535 
(0.372) 
-0.011 
(0.358) 
   10 to 19 years 0.392 
(0.269) 
0.567 
(0.353) 
0.064 
(0.329) 
   20 to 49 0.191 
(0.263) 
0.281 
(0.348) 
0.054 
(0.316) 
   50 and more -0.052 
(0.272) 
0.019 
(0.361) 
-0.088 
(0.327) 
Mono-unit 0.047 
(0.1109) 
0.217 
(0.132) 
-0.173 
(0.142) 
Union representative 0.149 
(0.108) 
0.083 
(0.130) 
0.170 
(0.142) 
Constant -2.119*** 
(0.305) 
-2.651*** 
(0.392) 
-2.196*** 
(0.396) 
Observations 1607 1607 1607 
Log likelihood -498.076 -323.102 -286.588 
Pseudo R² 0.096 0.083 0.115 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; ***significance at the 1% level 
Table 4. Probit models of the likelihood of being funded by private equity (2005) 
 
 Model 1 
French or 
Anglo-Saxon 
PE 
Model 2 
French PE 
Model 3 
Anglo-Saxon 
PE 
Industry    
   Industrial sector 0.050 
(0.116) 
-0.176 
(0.132) 
0.452** 
(0.179) 
   Construction -0.747** 
(0.312) 
-0.929** 
(0.398) 
-0.089 
(0.415) 
   Wholesale and retail trade -0.386** 
(0.162) 
-0.786*** 
(0.219) 
0.360 
(0.230) 
   Others Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Parent firm size    
   Less than 50 employees Ref. Ref. Ref. 
   50 - 99 employees 0.114 
(0.211) 
0.267 
(0.235) 
-0.201 
(0.372) 
   100 - 199 employees 0.144 
(0.212) 
0.064 
(0.258) 
0.273 
(0.306) 
   200 - 499 employees 0.338 
(0.205) 
0.308 
(0.247) 
0.341 
(0.303) 
   500 - 999 employees 0.448** 
(0.217) 
0.334 
(0.258) 
0.494 
(0.316) 
   1000 - 4999 employees 0.337 
(0.227) 
0.288 
(0.267) 
0.331 
(0.331) 
   5000 and more -0.231 
(0.263) 
0.020 
(0.300) 
-0.500 
(0.415) 
Age of the establishment    
   Less than 10 years Ref. Ref. Ref. 
   10 to 19 years -0.144 
(0.200) 
-0.281 
(0.213) 
0.463 
(0.438) 
   20 to 49 0.001 
(0.178) 
-0.235 
(0.189) 
0.729* 
(0.410) 
   50 and more 0.014 
(0.190) 
-0.260 
(0.208) 
0.758* 
(0.416) 
Mono-unit -0.202 
(0.123) 
-0.180 
(0.147) 
-0.134 
(0.162) 
Union representative 0.341** 
(0.132) 
0.132 
(0.151) 
0.639*** 
(0.212) 
Constant -1.519*** 
(0.224) 
-1.343*** 
(0.243) 
-3.271*** 
(0.492) 
Observations 1320 1320 1320 
Log likelihood -378.481 -258.486 -191.931 
Pseudo R² 0.089 0.074 0.148 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; ***significance at the 1% level 
 
  
Table 5. Propensity score matching – effect of PE on employment reduction and temporary workers 
presence (2011 and 2005) 
 
 Effect of PE - 2011 Effect of PE - 2005 
Employment reduction: Effect SE OS Effect SE OS 
Overall workforce       
   Nearest-neighbour matching 0.067 0.053 0 0.052 0.054 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) 0.086** 0.039 0 0.101** 0.044 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) 0.087** 0.039 0 0.090** 0.043 0 
Managers       
   Nearest-neighbour matching 0.020 0.041 0 0.079* 0.044 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) 0.049 0.032 0 0.070* 0.037 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) 0.047 0.033 0 0.062* 0.038  
First-line managers and technicians       
   Nearest-neighbour matching 0.039 0.039 0 0.095* 0.050 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) 0.064* 0.034 0 0.116*** 0.042 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) 0.057 0.035 0 0.109** 0.043 0 
Office and clerical worker       
   Nearest-neighbour matching 0.060 0.051 0 -0.024 0.049 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) 0.079** 0.038 0 0.044 0.042 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) 0.068* 0.039 0 0.033 0.045 0 
Skilled and unskilled workers       
   Nearest-neighbour matching 0.043 0.067 0 -0.020 0.060 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) 0.071 0.051 0 0.073 0.051 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) 0.068 0.051 0 0.047 0.050 0 
Temporary workers presence       
   Nearest-neighbour matching 0.069 0.054 0 -0.005 0.058 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) 0.045 0.037 0 0.081* 0.043 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) 0.029 0.040 0 0.050 0.043 0 
*significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; ***significance at the 1% level 
Notes: Standard errors for kernel matching algorithms (normal/Gaussian and Epanechnikov) are 
based on 1000 bootstrap replications. Standard errors for nearest-neighbour algorithms are based 
on the method proposed by Abadie and al. (2004).  
OS (off support) indicates the number of treated individuals discarded because of missing common 
support. 
 
  
Table 6. Propensity score matching – effect of French PE and foreign PE on employment reduction 
and temporary workers presence (2011) 
 
 Effect of French PE Effect of foreign PE 
Employment reduction: Effect SE OS Effect SE OS 
Overall workforce       
   Nearest-neighbour matching 0.067 0.053 0 0.130 0.083 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) 0.011 0.050 0 0.173*** 0.056 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) 0.007 0.050 0 0.170*** 0.056 0 
Managers       
   Nearest-neighbour matching -0.055 0.051 0 0.064 0.064 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) -0.007 0.040 0 0.110** 0.051 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) -0.013 0.041 0 0.113** 0.050 0 
First-line managers and technicians       
   Nearest-neighbour matching -0.038 0.049 0 0.075 0.063 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) 0.037 0.045 0 0.097* 0.050 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) 0.026 0.046 0 0.085* 0.052 0 
Office and clerical worker       
   Nearest-neighbour matching 0.015 0.066 0 0.139* 0.073 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) 0.037 0.048 0 0.132** 0.057 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) 0.027 0.048 0 0.124** 0.056 0 
Skilled and unskilled workers       
   Nearest-neighbour matching 0.024 0.094 0 0.044 0.099 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) 0.051 0.072 0 0.107 0.066 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) 0.028 0.074 0 0.121* 0.072 0 
Temporary workers presence       
   Nearest-neighbour matching 0.012 0.070 0 0.096 0.085 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) -0.023 0.051 0 0.161*** 0.052 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) -0.036 0.054 0 0.130** 0.054 0 
*significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; ***significance at the 1% level 
Notes: Standard errors for kernel matching algorithms (normal/Gaussian and Epanechnikov) are 
based on 1000 bootstrap replications. Standard errors for nearest-neighbour algorithms are based 
on the method proposed by Abadie and al. (2004).  
OS (off support) indicates the number of treated individuals discarded because of missing common 
support. 
 
  
Table 7. Propensity score matching – effect of French PE and foreign PE on employment reduction 
and temporary workers presence (2005) 
 
 Effect of French PE Effect of foreign PE 
Employment reduction: Effect SE OS Effect SE OS 
Overall workforce       
   Nearest-neighbour matching -0.009 0.059 0 0.229** 0.093 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) 0.040 0.052 0 0.177*** 0.067 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) 0.035 0.053 0 0.125* 0.068 0 
Managers       
   Nearest-neighbour matching 0.097* 0.069 0 0.008 0.067 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) 0.098* 0.051 0 0.035 0.052 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) 0.094* 0.049 0 0.015 0.054 0 
First-line managers and technicians       
   Nearest-neighbour matching 0.059 0.057 0 0.088 0.080 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) 0.010* 0.053 0 0.133** 0.067 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) 0.093* 0.052 0 0.114* 0.067 0 
Office and clerical worker       
   Nearest-neighbour matching -0.027 0.059 0 0.051 0.082 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) 0.010 0.052 0 0.098 0.063 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) 0.004 0.055 0 0.072 0.069 0 
Skilled and unskilled workers       
   Nearest-neighbour matching 0.017 0.080 0 0.121 0.090 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) 0.042 0.063 0 0.145** 0.079 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) 0.014 0.063 0 0.095 0.077 0 
Temporary workers presence       
   Nearest-neighbour matching 0.008 0.071 0 0.101 0.090 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) 0.028 0.064 0 0.184*** 0.056 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) 0.008 0.060 0 0.111** 0.051 0 
*significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; ***significance at the 1% level 
Notes: Standard errors for kernel matching algorithms (normal/Gaussian and Epanechnikov) are 
based on 1000 bootstrap replications. Standard errors for nearest-neighbour algorithms are based 
on the method proposed by Abadie and al. (2004).  
OS (off support) indicates the number of treated individuals discarded because of missing common 
support. 
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i
 In their Guide on Private Equity and Venture Capital, the EVCA (European Private Equity & Venture 
Capital Association) defines VC, strictly speaking, as “a subset of private equity and refers to equity 
investments made for the launch, early development, or expansion of a business. It has a particular 
emphasis on entrepreneurial undertakings rather than on mature businesses”. PE is broader and 
also used to define the financing of mature businesses. Our study does not focus on early 
development (VC) but on mature businesses (PE). 
ii We use the psmatch2 program for Stata provided by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) and the the 
nnmatch program on Stata proposed by Abadie and al. (2004). 
iii See Heckman et al. (1997), Smith and Todd (2005), Imbens (2004), Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) 
for overviews. 
